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ARGUMENT
THE APPELLANT DID MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE
The State's attorney made the argument and assertion that the "Appellant has
not even attempted to marshal the evidence . . ." (Brief of Appellee at 9). The
Appellant's brief contained an extensive compilation of the facts. In the argument
section, the Appellant referred to the findings or lack thereof that the trial judge
made that supported his decision to deny defendant's motion to withdraw his plea.
In State in re W.A. v. State, 2002 UT 127, (Utah 2002), the Utah Supreme
Court stated that "marshaling requires that the party challenging the finding show
us where the evidence can be located and list the specific evidence supporting the
verdict." Id.

The Appellant has done this throughout his brief, both in the facts

and in the argument.
In Neely v. Bennett, 51 P.3d 724 (Utah Ct. App. 2002), this Court stated that
"[i]n order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the
appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array of supporting evidence,
the challenger must ferret out a fatal law in the evidence." Id. at 726.
Furthermore, in the case of State v. Larsen 999 P.2d 1252, 1255 (Utah Ct.
App. 2000) the court held:
1

Defendant "must marshal all the evidence in support of the trial court's
findings of fact and then demonstrate that the evidence including all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings
against an attack. " (Citing State v. Moosman 794 P.2d 474, 475-76 (Utah
1990))

The Appellant met the marshaling requirement throughout the brief. The
facts were well spelled out in detail with references to the record. The Appellant's
argument referred to the limited evidence the trial judge utilized in coming to his
decision to deny the defendants motion to withdraw his plea. The Defendant
furthermore cited to the record and showed this Court where the evidence can be
located, as well as attaching each relevant page of the hearing transcripts in the
addendum. It was then that the brief attacked the trial court's legal and factual
conclusions.
The State's brief cited several references to the defendant's intoxication or
lack thereof. Each of these references is clearly cited in the defendants brief. For
sake of clarity defendant will restate each citation in defendants brief regarding the
trial courts inquiry into the defendant's alleged intoxication.
'The trial court asked the Defendant, 'Now, you're not under the influence
of alcohol or drugs here today in court, are you?' The Defendant answered, 'No.'
(R. 41/7) In a discussion on the Defendant's custody status between plea and
sentencing, the prosecutor raised the issue that the Defendant had been drinking
and should be taken into custody. The court asked how the prosecutor knew that he
2

had been drinking and the prosecutor stated, T can tell he's been drinking. I can
smell it.' (R. 41/8) The trial court then made a cursory inquiry as to the
Defendant's drinking by asking, 'Well, I just asked you if you had had anything to
drink, any alcohol or drugs, and you said no.' The Defendant answered, T'm not
under the influence of alcohol.' The Judge then said, 'Okay. You're not under the
influence of alcohol.' To which the Defendant answered, 'No.' The Judge then
asked, "but you have been drinking?' to which the Defendant answered, T have a
little bit of a back problem.' (R. 41/9) The trial court made no further inquiry as to
the amount of alcohol consumed by the Defendant, and whether or not he could
even competently answer the questions regarding his level of intoxication. The
court then took the Defendant's plea of guilty. (R. 41/10) The court immediately
had the Defendant taken into custody due in part to the fact that he had been
drinking and that 'this is just too dangerous to leave you out with this kind of
situation.'" (R. 41/14) (Brief of Appellant 7,8)
"The trial court acknowledged that the Defendant had been drinking at the
time that he entered his guilty plea. (R. 41/65) The trial court ruled that after
viewing the video of the proceedings, the court didn't see anything that suggested
that the Defendant was impaired. The trial court stated, T didn't see slurred speech,
I didn't see wavering or, or having trouble standing up or talking at all.' (R. 41/66)
The court further stated, 'you seemed to understand all of the questions that I put to
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you and your answers appeared to be articulate and coherent.' (R. 41/66)" (Brief of
Appellant 9)
"The trial court then ruled: 'So I'm going to find that we satisfied Rule 11.
I'm also going to find that the plea in this case was both voluntary and knowing.
And you may have been drinking but I just don't think that you were under the
influence of an alcohol to a degree that it rendered you incapable of understanding
what was going on that day.' (R. 41/66)" (Brief of Appellant 10)
"On the last of those hearing, the trial court heard arguments, heard from the
Defendant, and apparently viewed the videotape of the plea proceeding. After
those hearings, the trial court denied the Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea."
(Brief of Appellant 11)
"Although six months after the plea hearing, the trial court made the finding
that the defendant was not under the influence to the degree that he was impaired,
the court did not review the appropriate factors. The trial court stated the test was:
[N]ot whether [the defendant] had been drinking, but as Mr. Laker
points out whether or not you were intoxicated, whether you were so
impaired that you didn't understand what you were doing at the time
you stood here in court and entered a guilty plea. That's the real issue
here.(R.41/64)" (Brief of Appellant 13)
"The trial court error in the present case did not inquire further into the
Defendant's mental condition once the court had been advised that the Defendant
had consumed alcohol prior to the plea hearing. The court was clearly aware that
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the Defendant had been drinking to the extent that the prosecutor, sitting at counsel
table could smell the alcohol emanating from the Defendant as he stood at the
lectern. The trial court made no inquiry into the amount of alcohol the Defendant
had drunk, nor the time frame in which he had consumed the alcohol." (Brief of
Appellant 114, 15)
"Although the Defendant did state that he had been drinking 'early this
morning' (R. 41/9) the trial court did not inquire as to how previous that had
occurred. Given the fact that the court commenced at 2:00 PM, the defendant very
well may have been under the influence of alcohol at the time the plea was taken."
(Brief of Appellant 15, footnote 1)
Clearly the defendant adequately marshaled the evidence. In fact, the
references to the evidence that support the trial court's decision were referred to
more often, and in greater detail in the defendant's brief than they were in the
State's brief. Despite these numerous references, the evidence clearly indicates that
the trial court did not adequately insure that the defendant was not intoxicated at
the time he entered his plea.
CONCLUSION
The Appellant did marshal the evidence in his brief. All of the factors the
trial court relied on in making its decision to deny defendant's motion to withdraw
his plea were referred to and cited to the record. Most of them were referred to
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multiple times. The Appellant is then entitled to attack those findings, which is
exactly what he did. This Court should look at the merits of the Appellant's
argument which is that all of the evidence notwithstanding, the defendant, due to
his intoxicated state could not knowing and voluntarily enter a plea..
DATED this J_ day of January, 2004.
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